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I. Introduction
It can hardly be disputed that there is an urgent need for devel-
oping countries to improve the mobilization of domestic savings.
Especially economies with large foreign indebtedness are required
to raise additional funds in order to service their liabilities.
Moreover, the adjustment burden caused by various external shocks
threatens further economic growth. Merely to tighten the belt
seems to be an inadequate cure; cutting imports to the bone
creates severe bottlenecks for economic development and other
austerity measures may have serious drawbacks such as a slowdown
of economic activities and increasing underemployment. The alter-
native is to adjust the economy to the changing international
environment by promoting investment in new and profitable econo-
mic activities. Since continued lending on international capital
markets to finance additional investment is largely ruled out
because of the reluctance of creditor banks to increase their
engagement in developing countries and since public aid by ex-
ternal donors is stagnating, the bulk of investment programmes
has to be financed domestically.
It is controversial whether this describes a realistic option,
though [for a more detailed elaboration of the following argu-
ments, see Fischer et al., 1985, pp. 40 ff. , and the literature
given there]. In particular for low-income developing countries
it is argued that a savings gap is due to a weak potential to
save rather than to lacking incentives to do so. Consequently,
savings are assumed to be inelastic to interest rate changes. On
the other hand, conditions of financial repression in many econo-
mies (characterized by artificially reduced interest rates which
in real terms are often negative) led others to hypothesize that
inadequate financial and monetary policies must be blamed for an
insufficient supply of loanable funds and the concentration on
assets with extremely short maturities. According to this view,
the potential is much greater than reflected by actual savings
mobilization. This potential could be exploited if financial re-
pression would be reduced.- 2 -
There are some problems to test these arguments empirically. In
cross-country studies differences in saving behaviour may be
attributed to other factors rather than different degrees of
financial repression. In country-specific time series analysis it
is sometimes difficult to discriminate periods of financial lib-
eralization from periods when policies were more restrictive.
Indonesia represents one of the few examples where this separa-
tion issue can easily be solved. The reform of financial regula-
tions introduced in June 1983 marked a major breakthrough towards
liberalizing financial markets. Although the period since then
may be too short to fully capture its effects on the amount and
structure of Indonesian savings, the short-term consequences of
this policy shift should be duly considered in the debate on the
role of domestic incentives in raising national resources. If
Indonesia succeeds to mobilize additional savings and to improve
the term structure of savings, this may help other developing
countries in a similar economic position to revise traditional
policy responses to external shocks which proved to be inadequate
in many cases. For example, Mexico, Venezuela and Nigeria heavily
depend on oil exports as Indonesia does. Thus the economic pros-
pects of all these countries were severely affected by falling
oil prices in the early 1980's. However, whereas Indonesia re-
acted by reforming financial policies, the other oil economies
postponed adjustments and instead stepped up foreign borrowing
considerably, largely on a short-term basis. Together with other
important areas of domestic economic policy the differences in
the financial course may explain why Indonesia experienced an
only temporary reduction in economic growth (1982) and remained
creditworthy in international capital markets, whereas Mexico,
Venezuela and Nigeria sufferpd from a prolonged decline in real
GDP and had to face severe debt problems.
The Indonesian policy reform is portrayed in the next section
after a short description of the financial conditions until June
1983. Section III presents an evaluation of the effects the
policy change has had on savings behaviour. Finally, it is dis-
cussed which lessons other developing countries can draw from the
Indonesian experience and whether the financial reform has to be
complemented by other policy changes.- 3 -
II. Financial Conditions before and after the Reform of 1983
Although Indonesia made great progress in terms of economic
growth in the last decade (per capita income 1975: 220 US-$;
1983: 560 US-$) it was lagging behind with regard to the develop-
ment of financial markets. This can be exemplified by the ratio
between financial assets (defined as M2, i.e. currency outside
banks plus private sector demand, time, and savings deposits) and
GDP as an indicator of the degree of financial intermediation.
Despite an increase from 14 per cent in 1970-75 to 20 per cent in
1981-83, the ratio was still among the lowest within a sample of
twelve developing countries [Fischer et al., 1985, p. 7], Even
for low-income countries like Bangladesh and Kenya financial
intermediation was more advanced. It was only in the most recent
past that the composition of M2 in Indonesia changed significant-
ly towards time and savings deposits (quasi-money). This shift
may largely be attributed to the financial reform of June 1983,
for in 1975-81 the ratio of highly liquid assets (Ml) as well as
the ratio of less liquid quasi-money to GDP remained relatively
stable.
Those who stress the role of economic incentives in mobilizing
domestic savings would attribute the poor financial intermedi-
ation at least partly to financial repression. According to this
view, government regulations resulting in low or even negative
real interest rates encourage potential savers to consume rather
than to save and in particular to stay away from longer-term
assets. Both the amount and structure of savings are assumed to
be elastic to interest rate changes. The evidence from Indonesia
fits into this explanation. According to Table 1 nominal deposit
rates mostly were too low to match the rise in consumer prices ,
as were many lending rates of the highly diversified interest
rate structure for credits.
Only for time deposits with a maturity of 24 months, real rates
of interest were significantly positive in some subperiods
(1976-78 and 1981-82); both shorter-term time deposits and



























































































































































n.a. = not available. - Nominal rates,are deflated by the change in consumer prices. - Period averages.
- Individually determined by banks. - Until mid-1983; individually determined by banks later on. -
e1974-
75. - 12 per cent, for deposits exceeding Rupiah 2.5 million . -"l2 per cent for deposits.exceeding Ru-
piah 1 million. - Since June 1983. -
16 per cent in case of withdrawal before maturity. --"Medium-term
investment credits of Rupiah 75-200 million (until 1978: Pupiah 25-100 million).
Source: Bank Indonesia, Weekly Report; Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics; IMF,
International Financial Statistics.- 5 -
Until the early eighties it was largely Bank Indonesia, i.e. the
central bank, which determined the level and structure of in-
terest rates [Nasution, 1983, pp. 86 ff. ; Lee, Jao, 1982, pp.
126-147]. For deposits as well as for credits the administration
left hardly any scope for commercial banks to influence the re-
turns on capital . As the principal reason for this policy it was
officially stated that national investments and economic growth
would be encouraged by subsidizing the use of capital [Bank Indo-
2
nesia, 1984, p. 1] . The determination of lending rates below
equilibrium put a pressure on deposit rates, which in turn
threatened to affect the mobilization of private funds for in-
vestment I Additional incentives and various savings schemes did
not help this situation significantly [for detailed information,
see Bank Indonesia, 1985] . Savings deposits continued to play a
negligible role. In December 1984 they accounted for less than 5
per cent of overall financial savings (Table 2) . Tax incentives
proved to be insufficient to compensate for negative real inter-
est rates . Moreover, in the rural areas the poor financial
Only as regards time deposits with maturities of up to three
months the commercial banks were free to fix deposit rates
since 1978.
2
Arguments according to which extremely low or negative lending
rates give rise to the waste of capital by fostering unproduc-
tive investments and inadequately capital-intensive productions
were largely discounted in these times [Kim, 1982, p. 43].
As a counterbalance, commercial banks were required by the
government to grant relatively high deposit rates which in the
case of long-term deposits tended to exceed lending rates.
Especially in the 1970's, Bank Indonesia provided considerable
interest rate subsidies in order to allow the banks a profit
margin; for time deposits with a maturity of 24 months subsi-
dies reached 15 percentage points in 1974 and were reduced to
4.5 points later on.Notwithstanding subsidies, real deposit
rates were, however, largely negative as shown above.
4
The National Development Savings Scheme (TABANAS) and the In-
surance Savings Scheme (TASKA) as the most important instru-
ments provided for tax-free interest income and promised lot-
tery prizes. In both systems deposits could be used as col-
lateral when applying for bank credits; especially for the poor
and landless population that otherwise had no access to bank
loans, this was thought to be an important incentive to save.
For low-income savers the favourable tax treatment was hardly
relevant because of low overall tax payments. Savers with TABA-
NAS-deposits in excess of Rupiah 1 million (about US-$ 970 in
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Source: Bank Indonesia, Weekly Report.infrastructure hampered the mobilization of savings .
It may be concluded that financial repression in the 1970's and
early 1980's severely impeded the propensity to save. Further-
more, commercial banks were strongly discouraged to make efforts
to mobilize private resources. It was much easier for them to
make use of cheap refinancing facilities granted by Bank Indo-
nesia. In June 1983 financial market conditions changed dras-
2
tically, however . In order to overcome financial repression both
deposit mobilization and lending activities of commercial banks
were deregulated. Only for savings deposits, the government con-
tinued to fix interest rates administratively . As regards time
deposits income accruing from interest payments was exempted from
income tax. Interest rate subsidies were phased out and banks
were allowed to set their own interest rates so that more private
funds could be mobilized. Measures were taken to reduce the
banks' reliance on cheap refinancing from Bank Indonesia. In
early 1984 new discount windows were introduced as last resort
for banks encountering temporary shortages of liquidity [Bank
Indonesia, 1984, p. 2]. However, in contrast to liquidity credits
thus far extended, official assistance was provided at market
rates of interest, so that banks were encouraged to resort to the
interbank market first before approaching Bank Indonesia [World
Bank, 1985, p. 29]. Moreover, the amount that banks might borrow
The density of bank and post offices outside the cities was
extremely low in Indonesia compared to other developing coun-
tries [Fischer et al., 1985, p. 79].
2
The policy reorientation took place against the background of
mounting balance of payments pressures. Due to falling export
prices for oil, the worldwide recession and extremely high
international interest rates Indonesia's current account defi-
cits soared to US-$ 5.3 billion and 6.3 billion in 1982 and
1983, respectivelj', after only US-$ 0.5 billion in 1981 and a
surplus of US-$ 2.9 billion in 1980. In the absence of foreign
exchange controls, capital could easily be transferred abroad
as fears of a depreciation of the Rupiah were rising. In order
to stop capital flight the authorities faced the choice either
to regulate capital transfers by introducing foreign exchange
controls or to liberalize domestic financial markets. It was
decided to follow the latter course of action.
For TABANAS-savings the interest rate was raised to 15 per
cent.- 8 -
through discount windows was linked to the size of funds raised
from the public .
During the liberalization most regulations were removed which had
* 2
hindered commercial banks to follow their own credit policies .
Most importantly, commercial banks were freed to set lending
rates individually. Since market forces were allowed to coordi-
nate the demand and supply of capital, quantity rationing could
be abolished. Accordingly, Bank Indonesia stopped to fix credit
ceilinqs .
Ill. The Effects of Financial Liberalization on Savings
Behaviour in Indonesia
The reform of financial policies was probably of major importance
for both the formal and the informal financial markets. Commer-
cial banks as well as money lenders, savings clubs etc. in the
informal sector needed to adjust to the drastically changed en-
vironment. Nevertheless the following analysis is confined to the
reaction of commercial banks and the effects on financial savings
in the formal sector. Data limitations render it impossible to
draw a fairly complete picture on savings generated outside the
banking system.
Another innovation, Bank Indonesia Certificates, could be used
by commercial banks as a temporary outlet of excess liquidity,
i.e. before mobilized funds were extended as loans to invest-
ors. The certificates carried interest rates determined on an
auction basis.
2
Bank Indonesia no longer insisted on numerous requirements, for
example as regards the shares of financing from the imple-
menting banks and self-financing from the borrowers, feasibili-
ty studies and financial reports to be delivered.
The liberalization was confined to lending to the non-priority
sector, however. For the so-called high priority credits the
authorities continued to provide subsidized refinancing (at an
interest rate of only 3 per cent per annum) and to regulate the
lending terms and conditions; for most of these credits in-
terest rates were set at an annual rate of 12 per cent. Export
financing, permanent working capital credits, production cred-
its, lending by cooperatives, small-scale investment credits
and house ownership credits were labelled as high priority
credits, for example [for detailed information, see Bank Indo-
nesia, 1984, p. 103. Although the list of credits under this
heading remained rather long, it was somewhat reduced.- 9 -
Even if financial liberalization improves the savings performance
in the formal sector, this not necessarily leads to a higher
overall savings rate. The former may be rather due to substitu-
tion effects. Informal financial intermediaries that granted
relatively favourable terms for deposits at times of tight of-
ficial regulation of the commercial banks' activities lose in
attractiveness when official markets are liberalized. According-
ly, depositors may shift their savings to the commercial banks
which leaves total savings unchanged. The relevance of substitu-
tion effects should not be overemphasized, however. This holds
even if one mistrusts national account figures according to which
Indonesia's overall domestic savings rate increased from an aver-
age of 23 per cent in 1981-83 to 25 per cent in 1984 [World Bank,
1985, p. 4]. First of all, conditions of financial repression
often do not prevail in the formal sector exclusively. In the
case of Indonesia also informal savings and credit clubs followed
the policy of very low or negative real interest rates prior to
the reform of 1983. The direction and the degree of substitution
then depends on the flexibility of adjustment to the new environ-
ment in both the formal and informal sector. Moreover, the as-
sumed shift towards commercial banks is conditional to the avail-
ability of suitable infrastructural facilities. However, informal
financial intermediaries are largely concentrated on the rural
areas where commercial banks are hardly present. Thus savers
frequently cannot switch their funds at tolerable transaction
costs even if they would like to do so.
Furthermore, the country's economic benefit may be raised even if
financial liberalization only induces a restructuring of savings
without affecting the overall savings rate. Efficiency gains may
result from a greater mobility of funds for investment, for exam-
ple, when these are withdrawn from informal financial systems
whose operations are narrowly restricted in regional terms and/or
in terms of the scope of lending operations. This argument also
applies to a second form of savings restructuring, namely the
shift from real assets (precious metals etc.) to financial sav-
ings, which may be induced by fighting against financial repres-
sion. Although overall savings may remain constant, the economic- 10 -




























































Source: Bank Indonesia, Weekly Report.
benefit of this substitution is evident since the supply of loan-
able funds increases. Thus the following analysis of the effects
of the financial reform on savings in the formal sector captures
important aspects of financial liberalization.
The financial sector in Indonesia is dominated by five large
state banks; in April 1985 they accounted for 60 per cent of
total Rupiah time deposits and more than 80 per cent of total
savings deposits [Table 3; see also Arief, 1978, pp. 18 ff. ;
Nasution, 1983, pp. 50 ff.]. Traditionally these banks were run
like government agencies. Because they enjoyed preferential
treatment by the government and had never been subjected to mar-
ket competition to any significant extent, state banks had lived
an easy life and bureaucratism prevailed. In light of their in-
flexibility, scepticism seemed justified whether these banks
would be able to promptly adjust to the new financial conditions,
which suddenly asked for flexible response to market changes.
However, the resoluteness of government policy left hardly any
choice rather than to learn the lesson without delay .
Whereas formerly cheap refinancing had led to excess liquidity
in the banking system, market conditions tightened drastically
after the reform. Since liquidity credits had to be paid back
to Bank Indonesia, the demand for funds in the interbank market
increased sharply [World Bank, 1985, pp. 27-29]. In the second
half of 1984 short-term interbank rates reached 80 - 90 per
cent per annum.- 11 -
Thus the incentives for commercial banks to rigorously engage in
mobilizing deposits of potential savers were very strong. Shortly
after the new policy was announced the banks started comprehen-
sive advertising campaigns. Interest rates for time deposits were
raised significantly. The shift was most pronounced in the case
of the state banks (Table 4). Within a year interest rates for
time deposits with maturities of six and twelve months jumped
from 6 and 9 per cent, respectively, to 16 - 18 per cent and 18 -
19 per cent. The increase in rates granted by private banks was
relatively modest; comparing the bottom levels of the spreads
given in Table 4, the margin averaged 2 percentage points between
March 1983 and March 1984. For the private banks financial condi-
tions did not change as fundamentally as they did for the state
banks. Since private financial institutions were severely dis-
criminated with respect to official refinancing until 1983, they
had to rely on funds raised from the public already prior to the
reform. The determination of interest rates by Bank Indonesia did
not apply to private banks, so that they could attract deposits
by offering favourable terms. However, they were not allowed to
play a major role in mobilizing savings (share of national and
foreign private banks in total time and savings deposits in early
1985: 37 per cent; see also Table 3). Their operations were re-
stricted to Jakarta . Furthermore, the latter were not authorized
to accept savings deposits except from their own employees.
Not only the commercial banks but also the public quickly re-
sponded to the new situation. Parallel to rising interest rates,
total bank deposits increased faster than experienced before.
Demand, savings and time deposits increased by 31 per cent in the
period March 1983 to March 1984 as compared to 23 per cent in the
year before. Offshore dollar accounts were partly transferred to
domestic dollar accounts [Sherwell, 1985], Table 2 presents some
interesting changes in the structure of financial savings:
This regulation was relaxed for private national banks recent-
ly, but retained for foreign banks.- 12 -
Table 4 - Nominal Interest Rates for Rupiah Time Deposits, March



















































n.a. = not available. - 12 per cent for deposits exceeding
Rupiah 2.5 million.
Source: Bank Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year 1983/1984.
- The increase in cash holdings (March 1983 - March 1984: 18 per
cent; March 1984 - March 1985: 6 per cent) was considerably
below the increase in total financial savings.
- The share of demand deposits (foreign currency deposits in-
cluded) in total deposits dwindled from 5 8 per cent (March
1983) to 48 per cent (March 1984). The decline continued later
on; in early 1985 the respective share amounted to less than 40
per cent.
- Savings deposits increased by 18 per cent (March 1983 - March
1984) and 20 per cent (March 1984 - March 1985) , but theirMftl
- 13 -
share in total deposits declined by one percentage point to 6.4
per cent in 1984 and 1985.
- On the other hand, time deposits gained significantly in im-
portance. Deposits in foreign currency included, the growth
rate amounted to 70 per cent in the period March 1983 - March
1984; Rupiah time deposits even doubled. Although the increase
of the latter slackened to 32 per cent in the following twelve
months, it again exceeded by far the corresponding rate for all
bank deposits (19 per cent).
Further insights into the rearrangement of financial savings can
be gained by the following trend estimates. Applying quarterly
data for different types of financial savings (DEP) in the period
from first quarter 1980 to first quarter 1985 the trend equation
can be written as:
DEP = Const. + aD + bT + cDT
Since DEP is defined in logarithmic form, the coefficients of the
trend variable T represent growth rates. In addition dummy vari-
ables account for the change in financial conditions in June
1983. The reform may have resulted in an once-and-for-all shift
in the level of savings, captured by the shift dummy (D), and/or
may have influenced the growth in savings, denoted by the slope
dummy (DT).
The estimation results presented in Table 5 provide some evidence
that savers gave preference to short-term assets in immediate
response to the financial reform. This is indicated by the posi-
tive parameters of D for cash holdings, demand deposits and time
deposits with maturities of one month and three months, whereas
for time deposits with twelve months maturity the shift dummy was
significantly negative . Perhaps this preference was due to un-
certainties of savers as regards the willingness and firmness of
public authorities to reduce financial repression. Moreover, the
consequences of the reform were difficult to foresee. Banks
needed some time to adjust and coming interest rate developments
Only the positive parameter of D for time deposits with 24
months maturity conflicts with this interpretation.- 14 -
Table 5 - The Development of Different Types of Financial Savings in Indonesia












































































































































Using quarterly data of I/1980-I/1985, the following trend equation was






= dependent variable, i.e. different types of financial
savings in logarithmic form;
= constant term;
= shift dummv (1/1980-1/1983:0; 11/1983-1/1985:1);
= time (I/1980-I/1985);
= slope dummy (I/1980-I/1983: OT; II/1983-I/1985: l'T) ;
t-values in parentheses; ***significant at 1 per cent level of confidence;
j**5 per cent level; *10 per cent level (two-tailed t-test).
NO separate estimates were run for local development banks because of only
marginal time and savings deposits placed there. In the case of savings
deposits, private foreign banks were neglected since they were not allowed to
mobilize savings deposits except from their own employees.
'For demand deposits a breakdown by group of banks was not available.
Source: Bank Indonesia, Weekly Report - Own calculations.- 15 -
were also influenced by the removal of interest rate subsidies.
This interpretation is consistent with the significantly negative
parameter of D for time deposits placed at state banks. Since
these banks faced the strongest adjustment burden, uncertainties
were most pronounced for their depositors.
However, the positive once-and-for-all shift was rather small for
the most important short-term assets, i.e. cash holdings and de-
mand deposits. It was clearly dominated by the remarkable reduc-
tion in growth rates, indicated by the negative parameters of the
slope dummy (DT) . The growth rate of cash holdings v/as nearly
halved in the period 11/1983 - 1/1985; the respective rate for
demand deposits dwindled to 1.4 per cent (from 6.9 per cent in
1/1980 - 1/1983) . Accounting for both the shift and the slope
effect, Table 6 shows that the latter outweighed the former al-
ready in the second quarter 1983 in the case of demand deposits.
The predicted savings in this category (row B) were considerably
below hypothetical figures (row A) calculated on the assumption
that structural breaks would not have occurred and the trend of
1/1980 - 1/1983 would have continued. For cash holdings the same
applies after three quarters only.
As regards time deposits the growth rate accelerated by roughly
50 per cent to 10.1 per cent on an overall level. Again the slope
effect dominated the shift effect from the beginning (Table 6). A
disaggregation by maturities provides further interesting in-
sights which stress the positive role of interest rate incen-
tives :
- The slope dummy remains insignificant in the case of short-term
time deposits. In this area, the deregulation of interest rates
started in 1978 already, when banks were allowed to fix rates
for deposits with maturities up to three months. Consequently,
no dramatic changes in short-term deposits were to be expected
by the reform of 1983 in the medium run.
- Growth rates more than doubled for time deposits with ma-
turities of six and twelve months. Predicted savings in these
categories exceeded hypothetical figures by 200 and 280 per- 16 -
Table 6 - The Development of Financial Savings in Indonesia with and without Structural Breaks,
First Quarter 1983 - First Quarter 1985
Time deposits
Total





































































































































































































































































































































































































































A: hypothetical savings in billions of Pupiah; proiections on the basis of the trend equation DEP =
Const. + bT for the period 1/1980 - 1/1983, i.e. assuming that structural breaks would not have
occured;
B: predicted savings in billions of Rupiah; calculated on the basis of the trend equation DFP = Const.
+ aD + bT +cDT for the period 1/1980 - 1/1985 (D = 0 for 1/1980 - 1/1983; D = 1 for 11/1983 -
1/1985), i.e. allowing for structural breaks in June 1983;
C: B-A/A in per cent.
Source: Table 6 - Own calculations.- 17 -
cent, respectively, in early 1985. This corresponds to the ob-
servation that the rise in interest rates was most pronounced
for these deposits (Table 4) .
- As regards time deposits with a maturity of 24 months, the
modest growth rates experienced in 1/1980 - 1/1983 turned
around to significantly negative values later on. Interest rate
subsidies, which formerly were strongly concentrated on long-
term time deposits, were abolished and the interest rate in-
creased considerably less than for deposits in the aforemen-
tioned categories.
The flexibility of savers in adjusting to changed conditions in
financial markets is also evident when considering the develop-
ment in deposits placed at different groups of banks. Since the
state banks responded quickly to the deregulation of interest
rates, their competitiveness improved. They succeeded in mobil-
izing additional savings, as indicated by the jump in the growth
of time deposits acquired (from 4.2 per cent before to 10 per
cent after the reform of June 1983) . Private banks were put under
pressure' from the state banks' competition. Since interest rate
increases were comparatively small in the private sector, the
expansion in savings deposited at the state banks was at least
partly to the detriment of private banks, especially the foreign
banks. Whereas time deposits placed at the state banks outpaced
the hypothetical trend values by 120 per cent in early 1985,
private national banks did not participate in the accelerated
generation of time deposits (for them the growth path remained
virtually unchanged compared to the pre-reform period) and
foreign banks even suffered a relative decline (Table 6).
Overall savings deposits were hardly influenced, notwithstanding
that in this area interest rates remained officially regulated
(though at a somewhat higher level). This may be explained by the
minor role savings deposits played before 1983 already. Moreover,
this form of financial savings was probably favoured by those,
whose savings were rather small in absolute amount. The hypothe-
sis of interest inelastic savings in developing countries may be
adequate for small-savers. Especially for the rural poor it is- 18 -
sometimes stated that they do not know the prevailing interest
rates altogether.
For the bulk of savers the results presented above point to a
rather flexible adjustment to interest rate changes. However,
depositors reacted mainly by restructuring their savings. The fi-
nancial reform's effects are considerably less encouraging as
regards the development of overall financial savings. Applying
the same estimation procedure as before, both the shift and the
slope dummy remain insignificant (Table 7) . If real savings are
considered, i.e. deflating nominal values by the rise in consumer
prices, the picture is still more disappointing. The shift dummy
D is skipped by the regression programme because of an insuffi-
cient tolerance level. The negative parameter of the slope dummy
DT even indicates a slight decline (by 0.4 percentage points) in
the growth of overall financial savings after the reform. Thus
expectations that the financial liberalization would induce ad-
ditional savings were not met until early 19 85.
Notwithstanding this result, a positive assessment of the reform
is justified. Its structural effects on savings improved the re-
funding of commercial banks. The shift towards longer-term time
deposits increased the supply of funds available for investment
credits. The sharp discrepancy between the depositors' preference
for highly liquid assets and the demand for loans with longer
maturities was reduced, though more needs to be done in this
respect (see the recommendations for complementary measures in
Section IV).
Moreover, the failure to mobilize additional savings may be at-
tributed to the rather short period of less than two years the
estimation of the parameters of the dummy variables is based on.
Whereas a given amount of funds could be easily restructured im-
mediately after the reform, it apparently takes a longer time to
raise more funds. The savings potential not yet exploited is
probably concentrated on the rural areas. The lack of an adequate
financial infrastructure renders the mobilization of rural sav-
ings virtually impossible in the short run. However, commercial- 19 -
Table 7 - The Development of Overall Financial Savings in Indonesia before and











































quarterly data of I/1980-I/1985, the following trend equation was
estimated: DEP = Const. + aD + bT + cDT,
where: DEP = the sum of demand, time and savings deposits and cash
holdings in logarithmic form;
Const. = constant term;
D = shift dummy (1/1980-1/1983:0; 11/1983-1/1985:1);
T = time (I/1980-I/1985);
DT = slope dummy (I/1980-I/1983: OT; II/1983-I/1985: 1«T);
t-values in parentheses; ***significant at 1 per cent level of confidence;
**5 per cent level (two-tailed t-test).
Deflated by the consumer price index (April 1977 - March 1978=1) for 17
Indonesian cities.
Skipped by the SPSS-programme applied because of an insufficient tolerance
level.
Source: Bank Indonesia, Weekly Report - Own calculations.
banks have begun to engage in the long-term process of overcoming
this deficiency. The Rural Savings Scheme (SIMPEDES) initiated by
the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, a state bank, in cooperation with
about 3500 village banks represents an important step in this
direction. Traditionally, the operations of the village banks
were largely restricted to channelling credits to the rural
areas. By SIMPEDES it is attempted to extend their activities to
savings mobilization. According to informations provided by US
consultants of the Center for Policy and Implementation Studies
(Harvard Institute for International Development) the pilot pro-
ject produced encouraging results already. Thus a broader attack
on the deep-rooted dualism in Indonesia's financial markets by
complementing the reform of 1983 is likely to help the mobiliza-
tion of additional savings in the longer run.- 20 -
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations for Complementary Measures
It has been shown that the reform of 1983 has reduced financial
repression in Indonesia significantly. Contrary to a widely held
belief, savers were well prepared to respond to higher interest
rates. However, until recently they restructured their financial
savings rather than adding to them. Though considerable efficien-
cy gains could be achieved by these structural effects, the lib-
eralization needs to be complemented in several respects in order
to succeed in mobilizing additional funds . First of all, com-
mercial banks must take steps to improve their efficiency in
addition to short-term adjustment. Especially the state banks
have considerable administrative overheads resulting in high
intermediation costs. The World Bank [1985, pp. 73-74] estimates
these costs at 7-8 percentage points of the lending rates charged
and concludes: "There is considerable scope for reducing inter-
mediation costs through improvements in the organizational
structure and operating procedures of the state banks and re-
ducing write-offs. In general, organizational restructuring,
improving management controls, rationalizing personnel use, and
improving credit review procedures could lead to a significant
reduction in the banks
1 costs".
Moreover, financial markets in Indonesia remain highly fragmented
and dualistic which renders the further mobilization of savings
difficult. Ir order to overcome this situation, banks should be
encouraged to strengthen the country's financial infrastructure,
especially in the so far neglected rural areas. The Rural Savings
Scheme (SIMPEDES) can serve as an example in this respect. As a
condition of success, bank procedures must be adapted to the
rural needs. A simplification of formal requirements would help
to attract savings from people, who so far kept out of the fi-
nancial system because of illiteracy, for example. Furthermore,
the connection between saving and the provision of credits should
be intensified. The access to bank loans seems to be an important
incentive to pave for those who cannot provide other collateral.
Indonesia's financial infrastructure can be further improved if- 21 -
the government would abolish the remaining discriminations in
financial markets. This applies to the activities of private
foreign banks in particular. They should be allowed to extend
their operations beyond Jakarta (as private national banks were
authorized to do recently) and to accept savings deposits. .Be-
cause of the managerial experience of foreign bankers they can
play an innovative role and raise additional savings by applying
new instruments and procedures. The relaxation of restrictions as
regards foreign banks' business would also help their refunding.
Presently, Bank Indonesia limits each private bank's borrowing
from the interbank market to 7.5 per cent of deposit liabilities.
It is mainly the foreign banks that are affected by this regula-
tion. A more liquid and flexible interbank market is required,
i.e. a transmission mechanism between the surplus of term-Rupiah
in the local banks and the scarcity in the foreign banks [Winder,
1985].
The government should also avoid to discriminate informal activi-
ties, such as self-help savings and credit unions. Since coopera-
tives outside the official cooperative sector are concentrated in
areas so far neglected by the organized financial intermediaries,
the former can play an important complementary role. Although
aggregate data are.not available, considerable savings are prob-
ably raised by informal activities. The government should not
comply with tendencies to regulate these activities and should
not press them to join the rather bureaucratic official coopera-
tive system. Otherwise their initiative threatens to get lost.
The role of informal savings and credit unions may also be under-
mined if they fail to consider carefully the consequences of the
changed overall financial conditions and to take adequate adjust-
ment measures. The cooperatives continuously tend to charge
lending rates which are negative in real terms. Correspondingly,
the interest rates members receive for their deposits are below
market levels. A substantial revision of this approach seems to
be urgently needed. Otherwise the attractiveness of self-help
saving activities will be eroded. Moreover, members would be
inclined to meet minimum savings requirements in order to apply
for credits and then place the borrowed funds at commercial- 22 -
banks, since deposit rates in the formal sector exceed informal
lending rates.
Finally, the reform of 1983 has to be supplemented by a fresh
impetus to the formation of efficient capital markets [see also
Sherwell, 1985]. This would help the long-term funding of barks.
For example, a more widespread use of secondary markets in bank
certificates of deposit should be encouraged. Existing limits
concerning the amount of such issues should be abolished in order
to give banks the chance to reduce their funding in international
capital markets. The stock exchange in Jakarta which presently is
beset with many constraints to expand should be revitalized. The
procedures for new listings must be simplified and price move-
ments should no longer be narrowly restricted so that prices can
fulfill their allocative function. This requires to reduce the
great influence and privilegies of the dominant state investment
company in the share market. In one sense, the financial reform
of 1983 has even impeded the development of capital markets. The
favourable tax treatment given to time deposits represent? a
significant discrimination against interest and dividend income
from equity shares and other long-term assets. In order to avoid
distortions, the unbalanced incentive structure must be removed,
either by extending the tax exemption to income from capital
market instruments or by phasing-out the concessions for income
from time deposits.- 23 -
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